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THE ALIBI WITNESS RULE: SEWING UP
THE "HIP POCKET" DEFENSE
There exists in California a critical deficiency in criminal
procedure which allows implementation of a "hip pocket" defense,
the fabricated alibi. The solution to this problem lies in the legislative
enactment of a notice-of-alibi statute. Several states currently have
alibi statutes in force. There are several points from these statutes
that should be included in the formulation of an effective and work-
able California statute. The critics of these statutes attack their
constitutionality; however upon review they have withstood the
careful scrutiny of the United States Supreme Court.' A significant
advantage of the notice-of-alibi statute is a reduction of trial time
and expense by elimination of frequent motions for continuances.
The reciprocal nature of a notice-of-alibi statute provides extensive
benefits for both the prosecution and defense and significantly
improves the administration of criminal justice.
Alibi witnesses have been used frequently and successfully as
a defense in criminal actions. In such a defense the defendant estab-
lishes that he was at a different location at the time the alleged crime
occurred. He therefore argues that he could not have been the per-
petrator of the crime.2 The defense of alibi is usually presented at
the close of the trial after the state has presented its case. When this
defense is fabricated and is presented at the last minute of the trial,
the prosecution can be surprised, resulting in many unjust acquittals
if a continuance is not granted.
A half century ago the "manufactured alibi" was considered
a primary loophole in the law.3 The perjury committed with this
defense provides a major escape for guilty defendants; however a
fabricated alibi would be virtually impossible if the prosecution had
the time to make an adequate investigation into the credibility
of the witness and the truth of the alibi assertion.
A reasonable doubt can easily be aroused in a jury when they
hear the testimony of an alibi witness that conflicts with the evidence
of the prosecution. When this witness takes the stand at the last
minute, the state has little or no opportunity to verify or refute the
testimony. With advance knowledge of the alibi defense, the prosecu-
tion could dismiss those cases in which the alibi is valid. If the alibi
is fabricated, advance notice would enable the prosecution to prepare
1 Williams v. Florida, 90 S. Ct. 1893 (1970).
2 Logan v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 128, 168 N.W.2d 171 (1969).
3 Millar, The Modernization of Criminal Procedure, 11 J. CgRi. L.C. & P.S. 344,
350 (1920).
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a proper rebuttal. The fear of a thorough inquiry by the prosecutioninto the validity of the alibi would tend to eliminate the offering of
perjured alibi testimony.
The notice-of-alibi statute digresses from the common law.'Traditional criminal procedure allowed innumerable defenses to be
admitted except autrefois acquit ,autrefois convict and formerpardon.7 At common law the prosecutor was faced with the difficult
task of preparing to meet any number of these defenses. Conse-
quently, seventeen states have concurred with proponents of the
notice-of-alibi statute and have enacted statutes requiring defendants
to give the prosecution notice of the alibi defense.8 California does
not have such a statute, thus perpetuating a crucial inadequacy in
criminal procedure in this state.
PRESENT LAW IN CALIFORNIA
In all states the broad discovery provisions of civil procedure
are limited to civil cases and cannot apply in criminal trials.' InJones v. Superior Court,10 California broadened the area of discovery
in criminal cases. In this rape case, the Supreme Court of California
required the defendant to reveal the names and addresses of those
witnesses he intended to call and to produce reports and x-rays heintended to introduce in evidence to support his defense of impotence.
The court noted that the defendant intended to disclose this infor-
mation at the trial and consequently rejected the assertion that this
forced disclosure was violative of the defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination." In ascertaining truth, discovery can be used in
criminal as well as civil cases.' 2
The ruling in Jones was extended in several cases 3 before the
4 Commonwealth v. Gonzales, 210 Pa. Super. 57, 231 A.2d 414 (1967).
5 Formerly acquitted.
6 Formerly convicted.
7 Millar, supra note 3, at 350.
8 ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 192 (1956); FLA. R. Caim. P. 1.200 (1968); ILL. REV. STAT.
Ch. 38, § 114-14 (1967); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-1631-33 (1956); IowA CODE ANN.§ 777.18 (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1341 (1949); M.C.L.A. § 768.20 (1968);Mn. STAT. AN. § 630.14 (1947); N.J.R.R. 3.5-9 (1957); N.Y. CODE CRaM. PROC.§ 295-1 (McKinney 1970); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.58 (1953); OKLA. STAT.ANN. Tit. 22, § 585 (1960); PA. R. CRIM. PROC. 312, 19 P.S. App. (1970); S.D.C.L.§ 23-37-5 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-22-17 (1953) ; VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-6561-62(1958); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 955.07 (1958).
9 People v. Lindsay, 227 Cal. App. 2d 482, 38 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1964); Clark v.Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 2d 739, 12 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1961).
10 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
11 Id. at 61, 372 P.2d 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. 882.
12 Id. at 58, 372 P.2d 920, 22 Cal. Rptr. 880.
13 See People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963);
People v. Dugas, 242 Cal. App. 2d 244, 51 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1966).
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Supreme Court of California gave the broadest interpretation of the
prosecution's right to discovery in People v. Pike.4 The court held
that it was not prejudicial error to require the defendant to supply
names, addresses and expected testimony, of all defense witnesses.
The court reasoned that this information would be disclosed at the
trial when these witnesses were cross-examined. However, this
argument assumes that the defense will call all its witnesses to tes-
tify; there always remains a possibility that a witness will not be
called.
It appeared from Pike that the Supreme Court of California
gave the prosecution unlimited and unrestricted ability to discover
the defendant's witnesses in criminal cases. However, the scope of
this ruling was narrowed in Prudhomme v. Superior Court5 and its
companion cases.' 6 The California Supreme Court ruled that a dis-
covery order that required the disclosure of the names, addresses and
expected testimony of the defense witnesses was beyond the trial
court's jurisdiction and void. However, the court did not bar the
prosecution from discovery altogether. The court noted that:
A reasonable demand for factual information which, as in Jones, per-
tains to a particular defense or defenses, and seeks only that infor-
mation which defendant intends to introduce at trial, may present no
substantial hazards of self-incrimination and therefore justify the trial
judge in determining that under the facts and circumstances in the
case before him it clearly appears that disclosure cannot possibly tend
to incriminate defendant. 1
7
Unless the above criteria were met, discovery should be denied. The
court realized that Jones was being applied too broadly and at-
tempted to narrow the scope of its application, fearing that the broad
application overlooked the defendant's fifth amendment rights.'"
However, as will be seen in the forthcoming discussion of the consti-
tutional issues, information obtained by a notice-of-alibi statute does
not violate a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.
The ruling in the Pike case was further qualified in Rodriquez
v. Superior Court.19 Despite the United States Supreme Court's
14 71 A.C. 617, 455 P.2d 776, 78 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1969).
15 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970).
16 In re Marcario, 2 Cal. 3d 329, 466 P.2d 679, 85 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1970) ; Brad-
shaw v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 332, 466 P.2d 680, 85 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1970).
17 Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 327, 466 P.2d 673, 678, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 129, 134 (1970).
18 Some commentators have concluded that the constitutional limits were
reached or exceeded in Jones. See 63 CoLum. L. Rav. 361 (1963); 15 STAN. L. REV.
700 (1963) ; Wilder, Prosecution Discovery and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimi-
nation, 6 Am. CRiM. L.Q. 3 (1967).
19 9 Cal. App. 3d 493, 88 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1970).
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approval of the Florida statute which requires disclosure of the
names of alibi witnesses, 20 the Rodriquez court ruled that an order
requiring the defendant to provide the prosecution with a list of alibi
witnesses was invalid in the absence of a statute requiring such
disclosure. The court stated that there were no cases which support
enforced disclosure of alibi witnesses. The court articulated the
extreme care judges must exercise in approaching compulsory dis-
covery for the benefit of the prosecution in order to protect the
accused's privilege against self-incrimination.
The Rodriquez court felt that the Supreme Court's holding in
Williams v. Florida,2 affirming the validity of the Florida alibi
statute, was inapplicable because it ruled upon a particular statute
which defined the rights of the parties and outlined a specific pro-
cedure. It did not solve the question raised in Rodriquez, where a
state does not have a statute requiring disclosure of the names of
alibi witnesses. The Rodriquez court noted that there is a monumental
difference between a statute which outlines rules of procedure and a
court order made on an individual case basis.2 2 The court also relied
upon the fact that the California legislature had rejected notice-of-
alibi legislation. 23 Applying the doctrine of judicial abstention, the
California court would not adopt new and important procedural
devices which its legislative body has considered and refused. 24
With reference to the Jones case, the Rodriquez court empha-
sized the rarity of a defense of impotence and concluded that no((common law" procedure was established to govern the case at bar.
The alibi defense is too common to allow a procedural change,
initiated by a court covering a rare defense, to expand into the area
of the alibi defense.
Finally, the court in Rodriquez stated that a court order is
inadequate because sufficient sanctions are not available. A citation
for contempt appears to be the only sanction. Exclusion of witnesses
is impossible because, "except as otherwise provided by statute,
every person is qualified to be a witness. 25
Besides disallowing court orders requiring disclosure of alibi
witnesses, the Rodriquez case pointed out a large flaw in these court
orders. Without a provision for excluding witnesses from testifying,
there is no effective method of preventing a defense attorney from
calling a witness. Since some lawyers would risk contempt to intro-
20 Williams v. Florida, 90 S. Ct. 1893 (1970).
21 Id.
22 Rodriquez v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 493, 497, 88 Cal. Rptr. 154, 156
(1970).
23 Cal. A.B. 464, Reg. Sess. (1961); Cal. S.B. 530 & 531, Reg. Sess. (1959).
24 Rodriquez v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 493, 88 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1970).
25 CAL. EvD. CODa § 700 (West 1966) [emphasis added].
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duce alibi witnesses, a contempt proceeding would be ineffective
because the real purpose of the order would be defeated.
Subsequent to Rodriquez there are two courses of action open
to the prosecution when the accused introduces alibi witnesses. The
prosecutor can rely upon his initial evidence, assuming that he has
presented a strong enough case to withstand the testimony of alibi
witnesses. Theoretically, a case properly prepared and presented
should not 'be discredited by any false alibi claims.
As an alternate course of action, the prosecution could ask for
a continuance after an alibi witness is presented. At this point of the
trial, the prosecutor can obtain the name and address of the witness.
If a continuance is granted, the prosecution can then investigate the
witness fully and present rebuttal evidence.
Continuances in criminal trials are allowed by statute in Cal-
ifornia26 and are within the discretion of the trial judge.17 In crim-
inal cases they have been granted during a trial2" and can be granted
without support of an affidavit.2 9 Of course, if a continuance is
granted, the result is a delay in the already overburdened calendar
of the courts;"0 but it is the only weapon in California to combat a
last minute parade of false alibi witnesses.
The continuance is not a very effective or efficient weapon
however; the system remains at a status quo, depending entirely
upon the discretion of a trial judge to grant a continuance which,
when granted, lengthens the time of a trial. This delay in the trial
may have a detrimental effect upon the defendant's case as well as
the prosecution's. The evidence presented by both sides becomes
"cold." Instead of deliberating upon the evidence immediately, the
trier of fact is forced to wait until a thorough investigation can be
completed.
California should adopt its own notice-of-alibi statute to elim-
inate these very substantial problems. Besides liberalizing discovery
in criminal cases, this statute would prevent the use of the "hip
pocket" defenses5-that defense created in the final hours of the
26 CAL. PEN. CoDE § 1050 (West 1970).
27 People v. Buckowski, 37 Cal. 2d 629, 233 P.2d 912 (1951) ; People v. Gaines,
1 Cal. 2d 110, 34 P.2d 146 (1934); People v. Loomis, 170 Cal. 347, 149 P. 581
(1915); People v. Farley, 267 Cal. App. 2d 214, 72 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1968); People v.
Clemmons, 208 Cal. App. 2d 696, 25 Cal. Rptr. 467, (1962); People v. Mason, 183
Cal. App. 2d 168, 6 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1960); People v. Maddox, 65 Cal. App. 2d 45,
149 P.2d 739 (1944); People v. Singh, 78 Cal. App. 476, 248 P. 981 (1926); People
v. Ponchette, 30 Cal. App. 399, 158 P. 338 (1916).
28 People v. Gedney, 10 Cal. 2d 138, 73 P.2d 1186 (1937); People v. Lafuente,
6 Cal. 202 (1856); People v. Lyons, 80 Cal. App. 257, 251 P. 648 (1926).
29 People v. Lyons, 80 Cal. App. 257, 251 P. 648 (1926).
80 "'bE, Nov. 9, 1970, at 60.
81 Stassen, The Show Window of the Bar, 20 Mnm. L. REv. 577, 580-81 (1936).
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trial to conflict with the evidence of the prosecution. A notice-of-alibi
statute also deters false alibis because defendants are aware that the
prosecution will investigate the information before trial. A refuted
alibi at a trial would normally have an adverse effect upon the out-
come for the defense. The time and expense of trials would be re-
duced by the employment of such a statute. If, after a pretrial
investigation, the alibi is verified, the state can dismiss the charges
and stop prosecution. Also, if the prosecutor is prepared for an alibi,
it will not be necessary for him to move for a continuance to inves-
tigate the alibi. Additionally, when an investigation has failed to
refute an alibi, the defense is supported by the fact that the alibi
appears more reputable. In view of these considerations, it is evident
that California should adopt a notice-of-alibi statute.
CURRENT NOTICE-OF-ALIBI STATUTES
Several states currently have in force alibi statutes similar to
the one this comment proposes for California. A review of the re-
quirements and application of these statutes will indicate elements
to be drawn upon in the formulation of a California statute.
The states that have alibi statutes require the accused to notify
the prosecution of his intention to use the alibi defense within a
certain number of days of his trial. 2 All of the statutes have addi-
tional requirements.
Eleven states require the defendant to name the specific place
where he allegedly was at the time of the crime. 8 Nine states require
the names of witnesses that the accused intends to call to support
his defense, 4 and several also require the addresses of these wit-
nesses." Iowa places a heavy burden upon the defendant, requiring
him to supply a statement of the substance of that which he expects
32 ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 192 (1956); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.200 (1968); ILL. REV. STAT.
Ch. 38, § 114-14 (1967); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-1631-33 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 777.18 (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1341 (1949); M.C.L.A. § 768.20 (1968);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 630.14 (1947); N.J.R.R. 3.5-9 (1957); N.Y. CODE CRrm. PROC.
§ 295-1 (McKinney 1970); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.58 (1953); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. Tit. 22, § 585 (1960); PA. R. CRIM. PROC. 312, 19 P.S. App. (1970); S.D. CODE
§ 23-37-5 (1967) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-22-17 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-6561-62
(1958); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 955.07 (1958).
8- ARIZ. R. CRrm. P. 192 (1956); FLA. R. CraM. P. 1.200 (1968); ILL. REV. STAT.,
Ch. 38, § 114-14 (1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1631 (1956); N.J.R.R. 3.5-9 (1953);
N.Y. CODE CRrn. PROC. § 295-1 (McKinney 1970); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.58(1954); OKLA. STAT. Tit. 22, § 585 (1960); S.D.C.L. § 23-37-5 (1967); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-22-17 (1953); WIS. STAT. § 955.07 (1957).
84 ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 192 (1956); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.200 (1968); ILL. REV. STAT.,
Ch. 38, § 114-14 (1967); IOWA CODE § 777.18 (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-
1341 (1949); M.C.L.A. § 768.20 (1968); N.J.R.R. 3.5-9 (1953); N.Y. CODE Cm.
PROC. § 295-1 (McKinney 1970); Wis. STAT. § 955.07 (1957).
.35 FLA. R. CRI'. P. 1.200 (1968); ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 38, § 114-14 (1967).
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to prove by the testimony of each witness. 86 Each statute requires
the defendant to give the prosecution written notice, and the courts
have upheld the trial court's discretion in excluding evidence when
written notice is not given.87
A majority of the statutes provide that failure to comply with
the provisions may result in the exclusion of alibi testimony from
everyone but the defendant. Florida allows a court to waive the pro-
vision for good cause shown.88 Iowa and Oklahoma allow the pros-
ecutor to obtain a postponement to investigate an alibi presented
without adequate prior notice.89 Ohio has even gone so far as to reject
alibi evidence intended for the impeachment of a state witness when
the defendant failed to comply with the statutory requirements. °
The alibi statutes, either by express provision or by construction,
give the trial judge broad discretion as to the fulfillment of the re-
quirements and application of the rule. This enables the judge to
waive any requirements for good cause shown or to exclude evi-
dence not disclosed in accordance with the rule. This discretion
depends upon his good judgment. The strict exercise of this discre-
tion is almost always upheld.4 1 In two Kansas cases,4 2 in which the
36 IowA CODE § 777.18 (1958).
.7 Gray v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 379, 161 N.W.2d 892 (1968); defendant's wife was
not allowed to testify as to the time her husband returned home because advance
notice of the alibi was not given to the prosecution. See generally Jensen v. State,
36 Wis. 2d 598, 153 N.W.2d 566 (1967); State v. Selbach, 268 Wis. 538, 68 N.W.2d
37 (1955).
8 FLA. R. CRim. P. 1.200 (1968).
39 IOWA CODE § 777.18 (1958); OKLA. STAT. Tit. 22, § 585 (1951); State v.
Rourick, 245 Iowa 319, 60 N.W.2d 529 (1953).
40 State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St. 1, 176 N.E. 656 (1931).
41 For cases upholding the trial court's use of discretion, see State v. Dodd, 101
Ariz. 234, 418 P.2d 571 (1966); Cox v. State, 219 So.2d 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969); People v. Jones, 118 Ill. App. 2d 189, 254 N.E.2d 843 (1969); Herman v.
State, 247 Ind. 7, 210 N.E.2d 249 (1965); Cockerham v. State, 246 Ind. 303, 204
N.E.2d 654 (1965); Lamar v. State, 245 Ind. 104, 195 N.E.2d 98 (1964); State v.
Rourick, 245 Iowa 319, 60 N.W.2d 529 (1953); Bush v. State, 203 Kan. 494, 454
P.2d 429 (1969); State v. Trams, 189 Kan. 393, 369 P.2d 223 (1962); State v. Coin,
189 Kan. 108, 368 P.2d 43 (1962); State v. Osburn, 171 Kan. 330, 232 P.2d 451
(1951); State v. Parker, 166 Kan. 707, 204 P.2d 584 (1949); Burns v. Amrine, 156
Kan. 83, 131 P.2d 884 (1942); People v. Longaria, 333 Mich. 696, 53 N.W.2d 685
(1952); People v. Fleisher, 322 Mich. 474, 34 N.W.2d 15 (1948); People v. Craw-
ford, 16 Mich. App. 92, 167 N.W.2d 814 (1969); People v. Chamberlain, 15 Mich.
App. 541, 166 N.W.2d 815 (1969); People v. Morris, 12 Mich. App. 411, 163 N.W.2d
16 (1968); People v. Williams, 11 Mich. App. 62, 160 N.W.2d 599 (1968); People v.
Johnson, 5 Mich. App. 257, 146 N.W.2d 107 (1940); People v. Wright, 172 Misc.
860, 16 N.Y.S.2d 593 (Columbia County Ct. 1940); State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St. 1,
176 N.E. 656 (1931); Jones v. State, 453 P.2d 393 (Old. Crim. App. 1969); Com-
monwealth v. Vecchioli, 208 Pa. Super. 483, 224 A.2d 96 (1966); State v. Plucker,
71 S.D. 78, 21 N.W.2d 280 (1946); State v. Escobedo, 44 Wis. 2d 85, 170 N.W.2d
709 (1969) ; Gray v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 379, 161 N.W.2d 892 (1968) ; Jensen v. State,
36 Wis. 2d 598, 153 N.W.2d 566 (1967); State v. Selbach, 268 Wis. 538, 68 NW.2d
37 (1955).
42 State v. Berry, 170 Kan. 174, 223 P.2d 726 (1950); State v. Rafferty, 145
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evidence was cumulative, 48 minor deviations from statutory require-
ments lead to the exclusion of alibi testimony. However, it appears
that if cumulative evidence had not been involved, the court would
have been forced to find this exclusion an abuse of discretion.4
In many states the defendant who intends to submit an alibi
defense is responsible for making the intention known in order to
fulfill the requirements of the statute. However, Florida, Illinois,
Minnesota, New Jersey and New York operate under different
provisions.45 Illinois requires the prosecuting attorney to file and
serve upon the defendant a written request. Defendant must then file
an intention to assert an alibi and must include specific information
as to his whereabouts at the time of the alleged offense and the names
and addresses of witnesses whom he intends to call. Without the
request of the prosecution, the alibi evidence may still be admitted.4"
In New Jersey the failure of the prosecution to make this demand
has been held to relieve the defendant of his obligation.47 Florida,
Minnesota and New York have similar provisions requiring action
by the state.4 8 Florida and New Jersey require the prosecution to
furnish the defendant with the names and addresses of witnesses it
will offer as rebuttal to the alibi witnesses.49 Florida provides that
both the defendant and the prosecuting attorney have a continuing
responsibility to promptly notify the other party if there are addi-
tions to the lists.50
Because indictments are not always definite as to when and
where an offense is committed, the alibi statutes can present a prob-
lem. When the prosecution cannot frame its indictment in specific
terms, it uses terms such as "on or about" for the time and "at or
near" for the location. This requires the defendant to account for
his time and location for an indefinite period without knowing exactly
what the state has in the way of proof as to the specific time and place
of the alleged offense. This may make it impossible for the defendant
to fulfill the requirements of the statute.5'
Kan. 795, 67 P.2d 1111 (1937). See also People v. Jones, 188 Ill. App. 2d 189, 254
N.E.2d 843 (1969); Bush v. State, 203 Kan. 494, 454 P.2d 429 (1969).43 See 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1016 (1964) for a treatment of cumulative evi-
dence.
44 But see People v. Fleisher, 322 Mich. 474, 34 N.W.2d 15 (1948).
45 FLA. R. CRrm. P. 1.200 (1968); ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 38, § 114-14 (1967);
MNiN. STAT. ANN. § 630.14 (1947); N.J.R.R. 3.5-9 (1957); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC.§ 295-1 (McKinney 1970).
46 ILL. REv. STAT., Ch. 38, § 114-14 (1967).
47 State v. Wiedenmayer, 128 N.J.L. 239, 25 A.2d 210 (1942).
48 FLA. R. Cam. P. 1.200 (1968); N.J.R.R. 3.5-9 (1957); N.Y. CODE CRIM.
Paoc. § 295-1 (McKinney 1970); Mnne. STAT. ANz;. § 630.14 (1947).
49 FLA. R. CIum. P. 1.200 (1968); N.J.R.R. 3.5-9 (1957).
50 FLA. R. CaM. P. 1.200 (1968).
51 A concurring opinion in State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St. 1, 176 N.E. 656 (1931).
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This problem is alleviated by statute in Illinois and New York.2
If the time and place of the alleged offense are not specifically stated
in the pleadings, the defendant may request definite information.
New Jersey and Florida go even further and entitle the defendant to
a list of the names and addresses of witnesses the state plans to call
to prove the presence of the defendant at the scene of the crime.53
Upon consideration of the alibi statutes in effect in other juris-
dictions, it is evident that there are elements of these statutes that
should be utilized in the formulation of an acceptable and operable
California statute.
RECOMMENDATION FOR CALIFORNIA
In order to incorporate the advantages of the statutes already
existing in the other states, the proposed statute should contain the
following elements: The prosecution must make a written demand
upon the defendant and include a statement as to the time and place
that the alleged offense occurred. This is necessary because, in Cali-
fornia the information or indictment need not state the precise time
and specific place of the alleged offense. The statute would enable
the defendant to prepare his defense for the exact time and place in
question.
The written notice must also include the names and addresses
of witnesses the prosecution intends to introduce to establish the
defendant's presence at the scene of the crime. This not only fulfills
the reciprocal nature of the statute required in Williams,54 but also
eliminates a procedural step that many other states have.
The defendant's notice-of-alibi must state the place at which
he claims to have been at the time stated in the demand for such
notice; it must include a list of the names and addresses of each
witness the defendant intends to introduce to prove his whereabouts.
Both the defense and the prosecution would be under a contin-
uous duty to promptly disclose any change in this information and
any additional names to be added to the list.
The exclusion of any alibi testimony from witnesses must be
said that requiring the defendant to account for his time and location for an indefi-
nite period in order to fulfill the requirements of a notice-of-alibi statute would be
a denial of due process.
52 ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 38, § 114-14 (1967); N.Y. CODE CIlM. PROC. § 295-1
(McKinney 1970); People v. Kamps, 4 Misc. 2d 518, 161 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Suffolk
County Ct. 1956); People v. Fort, 141 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1956); People v.
Wright, 172 Misc. 860, 16 N.Y.S.2d 593 (Columbia County Ct. 1940).
53 FLA. R. Cnm. P. 1.200 (1968); N.J.R.R. 3.5-9 (1953).
54 Williams v. Florida, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 1896 (1970).
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within the discretion of the trial court. When good cause is shown,
exceptions to the statute may be allowed.
Therefore, California's notice-of-alibi statute should read:
Upon the written demand of the prosecuting attorney, specify-
ing, as particularly as is known to such prosecuting attorney, theplace, date, and time of the commission of the crime or crimes
charged, and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom
the prosecuting attorney intends to rely to establish the defendant's
presence, a defendant in a criminal case who intends to offer evi-
dence of an alibi in his defense shall, not less than ten days before
trial or such other time as the court may direct, file and serve upon
such prosecuting attorney a written notice of his intention to claim
such alibi, which notice shall contain specific information as to theplace at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of
the alleged offense and, as particularly as is known to defendant or
his attorney, the names and addresses of the witnesses by whom
he proposes to establish such alibi. Both the defendant and the
prosecuting attorney shall be under a continuing duty to promptly
disclose the names and addresses of additional witnesses which
come to the attention of either party subsequent to filing their
respective witness lists as provided in this rule. If a defendant fails
to file and serve a copy of such notice as herein required, the court
may exclude evidence offered by such defendant for the purpose
of proving an alibi. If such notice is given by a defendant, the
court may exclude the testimony of any witness offered by the
defendant for the purpose of proving an alibi if the name and
address of such witness, as particularly as is known to defendant
or his attorney, is not stated in such notice. If the prosecuting
attorney fails to file and serve a copy on the defendant of a list of
witnesses as herein provided, the court may exclude evidence
offered by the state in rebuttal to the defendant's alibi evidence.
If such notice is given by the prosecuting attorney, the court may
exclude the testimony of any witness offered by the prosecuting
attorney for the purpose of rebutting the defense of alibi if the
name and address of such witness, as particularly as is known to
the prosecuting attorney, is not stated in such notice. For good
cause shown the court may waive the requirements of this rule.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY ALIBI STATUTES
Self-Incrimination
Consideration of a notice-of-alibi statute raises fundamental
constitutional questions. Alibi statute critics argue that requiring a
defendant to give prior notice of his alibi and a list of his witnesses
is compelling him to be a witness against himself. This, it is argued,
is contrary to the rule against self-incrimination guaranteed by the
fifth and fourteenth amendments.55 However, the United States
55 Id. at 1911 (dissenting opinion).
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Supreme Court concluded otherwise in Williams v. Florida.56 There
the Court held, as has every court that has considered the issue, that
the privilege against self-incrimination is not violated by the require-
ments of an alibi statute. 57 In Williams, the defendant was required
to give the state the name and address of his alibi witness prior to
the trial. Williams, who was accused of robbery, argued that this
furnished the state with information useful in his conviction. The
state was able to take a pre-trial deposition from the witness and
acquire rebuttal testimony. The defendant also claimed that the dis-
closure of the elements of his defense interfered with his right to wait
until after the prosecution had presented its case to decide his de-
fense. The Supreme Court rejected both of these arguments. The
defendant in a criminal trial is sometimes forced by circumstances
to testify himself and to introduce other witnesses to prevent his
conviction. By introducing these witnesses, he must reveal their iden-
tity and submit them to cross-examination, which may prove incrim-
inating. The defendant's dilemma, to remain silent or to present a
defense, has never been considered an invasion of the right against
self-incrimination.
The pressures generated by the State's evidence may be severe but
they [the generated pressures] do not vitiate the defendant's choice
to present an alibi defense and witnesses to prove it, even though the
attempted defense ends in catastrophe for the defendant. However
"testimonial" and "incriminating" the alibi defense proves to be, it
cannot be considered "compelled" within the meaning of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.58
The notice-of-alibi rule cannot be said to affect the crucial de-
cision that the defendant must make. "At most, the rule only com-
pelled petitioner to accelerate the timing of his disclosure, forcing
him to divulge at an earlier date information which the petitioner
from the beginning planned to divulge at trial."5 9 A defendant is not
entitled to await the end of the prosecution's case before announcing
the nature of his defense any more than he is able to await the jury's
verdict before deciding whether to testify himself.
56 90 S. Ct. 1893 (1970).
57 See also Rider v. Crouse, 357 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1966) ; State v. Dodd, 101
Ariz. 234, 418 P.2d 571 (1966); State v. Stump, 254 Iowa 1181, 119 N.W.2d 210,
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 853 (1963); Commonwealth v. Vecchiolli, 208 Pa. Super. 483,
224 A.2d 96 (1966); State v. Angeleri, 51 N.J. 382, 241 A.2d 3 (1968); State v.
Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980 (1966) ; People v.
Rakiec, 260 App. Div. 452, 23 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1940); People v. Schade, 161 Misc.
212, 292 N.Y.S. 612 (Queens County Ct. 1936); State ex rel. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis.
2d 129, 163 N.W.2d 177 (1968); State v. Kopacka, 261 Wis. 70, 51 N.W.2d 495
(1952).
58 Williams v. Florida, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 1897 (1970).
59 Id. at 1898.
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One must remember that if the alibi defense was a surprise to
the prosecution, a reasonable continuance could be granted to in-
vestigate and prepare a rebuttal. A continuance at this point would
not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. €0
In order to be unconstitutional, the notice-of-alibi statute must
"compel" the defendant to be a witness against himself. First of all,
the information sought by the statute does not pertain to matters
which may incriminate the defendant but to matters that may exon-
erate the accused. However, it could be argued that information
provided to exonerate oneself may provide a link to evidence that
convicts. Still there is nothing compulsory in the notice-of-alibi stat-
ute; it merely gives the prosecution the right to demand information
in regard to a specific defense, the alibi, and directs the defendant to
surrender that information if he intends to use alibi witnesses.
Certain it is that there is nothing about the section [statute] which
compels the defendant to incriminate himself, nor is there anything
which compels him to give any information to the district attorney
unless he voluntarily and for his own benefit intends to use an alibi
defense.01
Due Process
The due process issue is also raised by the alibi statute. This has
evolved in several different forms. It has been argued that the defen-
dant loses any advantage of surprise by giving advance notice.62
Practically speaking, this impact of surprise is eliminated if a con-
tinuance is granted at the request of the prosecution. As noted above,
no constitutional question would be raised if a continuance was
granted as soon as the alibi witness was called.6" Any change made
by adopting a statute is only a procedural change, not an alteration
of the substance of the law; it is not up to the defendant to determine
the procedure of the trial.6 4
A due process issue is also raised in the exclusion of evidence
at the trial because the defendant failed to comply with the statu-
tory requirements. In Williams" the Court rejected the argument
that this was violative of due process. Mr. Justice White, writing for
the majority, felt there was ample room in the adversary system of
60 Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV.
228 (1964).61 People v. Schade, 161 Misc. 212, 215, 292 N.Y.S. 612, 615 (Queens County Ct.
1936).
62 Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962)
(dissenting opinion).63 Traynor, supra note 60, at 228.
64 Epstein, Advance Notice of Alibi, 55 J. Cnm. L.C. & P.S. 29, 32 (1964).65 Williams v. Florida, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 1896 (1970).
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trial for a notice-of-alibi statute "designed to enhance the search
for truth in the criminal trial by insuring both the defendant and the
state ample opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial to the
determination of guilt or innocence."6 6 Seeing the ease with which
an alibi could be fabricated, the Supreme Court saw a state interest
in protecting against "an eleventh hour" defense.1
7
Compulsory Process
The Defendant's sixth amendment right to have compulsory
process to obtain witnesses raises a final constitutional issue. 8 Stat-
utes that would prohibit a defendant from calling a witness to the
stand violate his constitutional right. Such an argument limited the
scope of a statute similar to alibi laws in the State of Washington.
Washington requires each side to provide the other with a list of
witnesses it intends to call.69 Washington courts hold that this is not
a mandatory statute, and the trial judge can exclude or retain the
testimony of a witness whose name is not listed.70 In a Washington
case, the court stated that if the statute was determined to be man-
datory and the defendant was not allowed to call a witness because
he was not listed, the statute would be unconstitutional because it
deprived the accused of a fair trial.7 ' The right to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses includes an implied right to have
those witnesses testify, and the statute is unconstitutional unless it
is discretionary. 72 Realizing that the purpose of the statute was to
eliminate surprise,71 the cases now require that surprise be shown
before testimony of an unlisted witness can be excluded.74 The sur-
prised party can ask for a continuance, and failure to grant one has
been held to be an abuse of discretion. 7' Although the Washington
witness statute does not give the prosecution notice of a defense, it
allows the state to examine defense witnesses and gather evidence
66 Id. at 1896.
67 Id.
68 U.S. CONST. amend VI; CAL. CONST. art I, § 13.
69 WAsH. REv. CODE § 10.37.030 (1956).
70 State v. White, 74 Wash. 2d 392, 444 P.2d 661 (1968); State v. Badda, 68
Wash. 2d 50, 411 P.2d 411 (1966); State v. Sickles, 144 Wash. 236, 257 P. 385 (1927).
But see State v. Martin, 165 Wash. 180, 4 P.2d 880 (1931).
71 State v. Sickles, 144 Wash. 236, 257 P. 385 (1927).
72 State v. Martin, 165 Wash. 180, 4 P.2d 880 (1931).
73 State v. White, 74 Wash. 2d 392, 444 P.2d 661 (1968); State v. Shelby, 69
Wash. 2d 295, 418 P.2d 246 (1966); State v. Williford, 64 Wash. 2d. 787, 394 P.2d
371 (1964).
74 State v. Willis, 37 Wash. 2d 274, 223 P.2d 453 (1950); see also State v.
Anderson, 46 Wash. 2d 864, 285 P.2d 879 (1955) ; State v. Hoggatt, 38 Wash. 2d 932,
234 P.2d 495 (1951).
75 State v. Willis, 37 Wash. 2d 274, 223 P.2d 453 (1950); State v. McCaskey,
97 Wash. 401, 166 P. 1163 (1917).
1970]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
for impeachment. This statute is broader than an alibi statute be-
cause it allows the state to examine all defense witnesses. It was held
to be constitutional as long as it was not mandatory. Therefore, as
long as the application of an alibi statute's sanctions are not manda-
tory, it would not violate the sixth amendment right to have compul-
sory process to obtain witnesses.
Furthermore, despite the precise language of the Constitution,
there are qualifications of the sixth amendment right of compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses." For instance, if a witness is outside
the state, the power of the court to obtain the witness does not extend
beyond the state line,77 and even if by statute the court may subpoena
a witness outside the state, 8 the matter rests within the discretion
of the trial court.79 A notice-of-alibi statute would only be another
permissible regulation of the exercise of the right to compulsory
process; so it would not eliminate the right.
Consequently it is evident that a properly constructed notice-
of-alibi statute does not violate the constitutional rights of the
accused.
CONCLUSION
As stated earlier, the accused as well as the prosecution would
benefit from the adoption of a notice-of-alibi statute in California.
As a practical matter, such a statute would be effective in eliminating
false alibis and efficient in reducing trial time. Additionally, when an
investigation has failed to refute an alibi, the defense is supported
by the fact that the alibi appears more reputable to the jury. Finally,
adoption of a statute would liberalize discovery in criminal cases, an
area that has lagged far behind its civil counterpart. The adoption
of a notice-of-alibi statute in California would better equip the courts
of this state for their task of determining truth and administering
justice.
Nicholas C. Fedeli, Jr.
76 In re Bagwell, 26 Cal. App. 2d 418, 79 P.2d 395 (1938).
77 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1326 (West 1970).
78 Id. § 1334.
79 Id. § 1334.2.
80 Myers v. Frye, 401 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1968); Moore v. State, 59 Fla. 23, 52
So. 971 (1910).
